Spinoza defines several kinds of knowledge by which we form general ideasⁱ . First, there is the knowledge we obtain through the senses, which he calls « knowledge by vague experience », and « truncated and confused ». Then he describes three other kinds of knowledge that enable us to form « ideas »: Imagination, Reason and Intuition, which he calls « knowledge of the first kind », « knowledge of the second kind » and « knowledge of the third kind » respectively.

Knowledge of the first kind is « opinion or Imagination », which derives from the signs or words by which we remember things, and by means of which « we form ideas similar to those by which we imagine them »ⁱⁱ . Knowledge of the second kind is « Reason« , which is derived from the fact that we have « common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things ». Knowledge of the third kind is « Intuitive Science » which, I quote, « proceeds from the adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to the adequate idea of the essence of things ». This convoluted formula is really not easy to understand. That’s why Spinoza says he’s going to explain it with an example – the « Rule of Three ».

As we all know, this Rule allows us, given three numbers, to obtain a fourth, which is to the third as the second is to the first.

There are two ways of applying it, one academic, the other immediate. « Merchants will not hesitate to multiply the second by the third and divide the product by the first »ⁱⁱⁱ says Spinoza, but for the simplest numbers no demonstration is necessary. « Given the numbers 1, 2 and 3, there is no one who does not see that the fourth (proportional) number is 6, » he explains. We see at a glance the relationship between the first and the second (the number 2 is double 1), and we conclude that the fourth is obviously 6 (double 3).

Spinoza thinks that we can apply the Rule of Three to the relationship between the ideas we form about God and the ideas we form about the world… According to him, there is a kind of proportion between: 1° the ‘formal’ essence of God’s attributes, 2° the ‘adequate’ idea we form of them, 3° the true essence of things and 4° the idea we form of their essence.

In other words, the idea we have of the essence of God’s attributes can be compared to the idea we have of the essence of things. This statement may seem self-evident: the idea of one essence is analogous to the idea of another essence – they are both ideas about essence. Any idea conceived by Man about any essence is, on a formal level, analogous to any other idea conceived about any other essence.

However, isn’t it difficult to put ideas about this world and ideas about God in correspondence, without any particular precaution?

Spinoza asserts that, in knowledge of the third kind, a relationship of proportion is possible between human thoughts about the essence of things and human thoughts about the essence of God. He thus explicitly rejects the hypothesis that no proportion is possible between God, Man and the World.

Let us now try to test this relationship of proportion, assumed by Spinoza, on three classic examples of the formulation of divine attributes: « God is », « God is alive », « God is one ».

1 « God is ».

God « is ». By this simple assertion, he is – without attribute or epithet. He is only this « He is« . « Being in God is not something added, but a subsistent truth », says S. Hilaire.^iv Thomas Aquinas similarly affirms that God’s being is not ‘added on’ to him. God’s being is not added to him, but « subsists » in him. His being is « without addition ».^v Boethius, seven centuries before Thomas Aquinas, had already said: « That which is may well, by a new addition, be something else again: but being, there is no addition to it ».^vi Thomas Aquinas gave as an example the difference between the beast and the animal. The ‘beast’ is the animal that is just that – an animal. The ‘animal’, on the other hand, is an animal that can also be reasonable, or unreasonable, or anything else. The divine being ‘is’, as the beast is a beast, quite simply. It is only ‘being’, – a being without addition. On the other hand, the being in general, and the human being in particular, « is » like the animal is an animal with specific possibilities of addition (« feathered animal », « reasonable animal », « political animal », etc.). Hence this possible analogy, if we follow Thomas Aquinas: The being of God is to the being of Man, as the being of the beast is to the being of the animal…

The very being of God only « is ». This does not prevent an infinite number of things from following from the divine being, through an infinite number of modes, says Spinoza: « An infinite number of things must follow in an infinite number of modes from the necessity of the divine nature, that is, everything that can fall under an infinite understanding ».^vii But the very being of God can only be this very being. If we believe, as Spinoza does, that this is the opportunity to discover knowledge of the third kind, then, by the Rule of Three, the very being ofman can only be that very being. Or can it be other than this very being?

2. « God is alive ».

Four centuries before Spinoza, Thomas Aquinas devoted the beginning of the Summa Theologica to questions such as: Is the existence of God self-evident? Does God exist? Is there in God a composition of essence and existence? Is God perfect? Do creatures resemble God? Is there in God a composition of essence and subject?

To answer this last question, Thomas Aquinas posits a sort of relationship of proportion between God and deity, on the one hand, and life and the living, on the other. « It is said of God that he is life, and not only that he is alive, as we see in S. John (14,6): ‘I am the way, the truth and the life’. Now deity is in the same relationship with God as life is with the living. So God is deity itself ».^viii The distinction between life and the living is a good example of knowledge of the third kind, which allows a formal analogy between the living God and what is life, or living, in man.

3. « God is one ».

What is the essence of divine unity? Is it a numerical unit? The number 1 would then enclose God, and contain him in its arithmetical essence, which seems impossible to admit.

Is it an ontological unity, a unity of being? God’s being would then be limited to being only this being, which is a (grammatical) mode of being, whereas God is supposed to be being itself, beyond all modes of being.

Is it a unity of essence? No. But every essence, whatever it may be, is already ‘one’, in a way by essence. To assert the unity of God’s essence is therefore a pleonasm, because every essence is essentially one.

Is it a ‘transcendental’ unity? Then it would be, to a certain extent, intelligible as an a priori form of reason.

Is it a ‘transcendent’ unity? Possibly, but then as a transcendent unity it is completely unknowable to reason.

As we can see, the possible formulations of the question of divine unity represent various ideas, more or less ‘adequate’, of what its essence might actually be. Let’s imagine that we choose, from among them, one idea (or another) of the formal essence of divine unity. By applying the Rule of Proportion, on the basis of this idea of divine unity, a similar idea of the essence of the unity of things in the world could emerge.

But let us immediately add that the analogy of proportion could also work in the other direction: if we form an adequate idea of the essence of a thing in the world, we should therefore be able to deduce an analogous idea as to the nature of the divine essence.

For example, we can conceive of something in the world as being ‘one’, insofar as it presents itself as a unique, singular entity.

By analogy, then, we can form the idea that God’s essence is also ‘unique’, ‘singular’.

However, there are many singular things in the world, and even an innumerable number. Would there then, by analogy, be many singular things in the world? Many « Gods », and even an uncountable multiplicity? Perhaps, but not necessarily. Applying the Rule of Proportion, we might only wish to deduce that there are indeed many singular attributes in God, and even an infinite number. This is what Spinoza does, and from this he draws this stimulating proposition: « The more we know singular things, the more we know God ».^ix

These examples show that it is possible to progress in our knowledge of God, even though he is infinite and has an infinity of attributes. This is how we can best define him: « By God I mean an absolutely infinite being, that is, a substance made up of an infinite number of attributes, each of which expresses an eternal and infinite essence ».^x

Spinoza’s God is even infinitely infinite, because each of his ‘attributes’ can have an infinite number of ‘modes’, i.e. affections. « By modes I mean the affections of a substance. »^xi Each mode is an affection of an attribute of the substance, and an attribute can have an infinite number of possible affections, and therefore as many ‘modes’. The substance of God, in so far as it ‘affects’ a certain thing, is translated into a particular mode. All things in the world are particular ‘modes’ in God, ‘affections of his substance’. We can also say that these modes are ‘conceived’, or ‘represented’, by means of particular things.^xii Thoughts too are ‘modes’ in God, ‘affections of his substance’. They are affections of the divine attribute that is thought.^xiii

The fact that there are ideas, the fact that there is ‘thinking’, is a ‘mode’ that expresses in a certain way the nature of God, insofar as he is a ‘thinking thing’.^xiv The fact of thinking a ‘singular’ thought (this thought, or that thought) is also a ‘mode’, which expresses the nature of God in a certain and determined way.^xv Finally, the bodies themselves are also ‘modes’ expressing God. ^xvi

All of the above can be called « third-kind » knowledge. What purpose does this knowledge serve, you may ask? This is a very interesting question, and one that goes to the heart of consciousness and unconsciousness. One possible answer can be found on the last page of the Ethics. Spinoza harshly criticises the « ignorant ». He says that the « ignorant » has, in a way, ceased to be: « The ignorant is almost unconscious. As soon as he ceases to suffer, he also ceases to be ».^xvii On the other hand, Spinoza values his antonym, the Wise Man. « The Wise Man, on the contrary, considered in this capacity, hardly knows inner turmoil, but having, by a certain necessity, eternal awareness of himself, of God and of things, never ceases to be and possesses true contentment. If the path that leads to it appears to be extremely arduous, it is still possible to enter it. And it must certainly be arduous which is so rarely found. How could it be possible, if salvation were within reach and could be reached without great difficulty, that it should be neglected by almost everyone? But everything beautiful is as difficult as it is rare.^xviii

Everything beautiful is difficult and rare…

But not everything that is difficult and rare is necessarily beautiful. Neither difficulty nor rarity are sufficient conditions for beauty.

Beauty comes like grace. But where does it come from?

To answer this question, we might need to know some kind of knowledge of a fourth kind…

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iSpinoza. Ethics. Part II. On the Nature and Origin of the Soul. Scolie 2 de la Proposition XL Trad. Ch. Appuhn. Garnier-Flammarion, 1965, p.115

iiSpinoza. Ethics. Part II. On the Nature and Origin of the Soul. Scolie 2 de la Proposition XL Trad. Ch. Appuhn. Garnier-Flammarion, 1965, p.115

iiiSpinoza. Ethics. Part II. On the Nature and Origin of the Soul. Scolie 2 de la Proposition XL Trad. Ch. Appuhn. Garnier-Flammarion, 1965, p.115

ivS. Hilaire. De Trin. VII. PL 10, 208

v« What is said about being without addition can be understood in two senses: either the being receives no addition because it is part of its notion to exclude all addition: thus the notion of ‘beast’ excludes the addition of ‘reasonable’. Or it does not receive addition because its notion does not include addition, as the animal in general is without reason in the sense that it is not in its notion to have reason; but neither is it in its notion not to have it. In the first case, the being without addition of which we speak is the divine being; in the second case, it is the being in general or common. « Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I, Question 3, Article 4, Solution 1

viBoethius. De Hebdomadibus. PL 64, 1311.

viiSpinoza. Ethics. Part I. Proposition XVI. Translated by Ch. Appuhn. Garnier-Flammarion, 1965, p.39

viiiThomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I, Question 3, Article 3.

ixSpinoza. Ethics. Part V. On the freedom of man. Proposition XXIV. Translated by Ch. Appuhn. Garnier-Flammarion, 1965, p.325

xSpinoza. Ethics. Part I. On God. Definition VI. Ibid, p.21

xiSpinoza. Ethics. Part I. On God. Definition V. Ibid, p.21

xiiModes are conceived as being derived from the divine substance, since they represent particular affections of it.

xiii« Thinking is an attribute of God, in other words God is a thinking thing. God ‘thinks’ when he ‘affects’ his substance in something other (than himself). Spinoza. Ethics. Part II. On the Nature and Origin of the Soul. Proposition I. Ibid, p.71

xivSpinoza. Ethics. Part II. On the Nature and Origin of the Soul. Demonstration of Proposition V. Ibid, p.74

xvSpinoza. Ethics. Part II. On the Nature and Origin of the Soul. Demonstration of Proposition I. Ibid, p.71

xvi« By body I mean a mode which expresses the essence of God, in so far as it is considered as an extended thing, in a certain and determinate manner. » Spinoza. Ethics. Part II. On the nature and origin of the soul. Definition I. Ibid, p.69

xviiSpinoza. Ethics. Part V. On the freedom of man. Scolia of Proposition XLII Ibid, p.341

xviiiIbid.p.341